Events
The applicant worked for a private company (subcontractor) at the Directorate of Public Health (Institution) under a fixed-term employment contract. The applicant made a personal post on a social networking site about the pressure on subcontracted workers and the managers, including the phrases “O human wastes, managers…”. Some managers of the Institution filed a complaint against the applicant for this post and the Criminal Court of First Instance convicted the applicant. Upon the finalisation of the decision to defer the announcement of the verdict, the applicant’s employment contract was terminated by the sub-employer. The Labour Court (Court) rejected the applicant’s reinstatement claim against the sub-employer and the Institution. The applicant’s application for appeal against the aforementioned decision was rejected by the Regional Court of Appeal (Chamber) and his request for appeal was rejected by the Court of Cassation.
Allegations
The applicant claimed that his freedom of expression was violated due to the termination of his employment contract due to his social media posts about the managers of the institution while working in a public institution as a subcontractor.
The Court’s Assessment
In addition to working for the Institution as a subcontractor, the applicant is also the chairman of an association for subcontracted workers working in public institutions. In this context, it should be accepted that the opinions of the applicant on the issues related to subcontracted workers cover social issues -in the field of interest of the non-governmental organisation he represents- beyond his identity as a subcontracted worker, as a requirement of his duty as the president of the association.
The applicant used the general term “manager” in his post, but did not use any expression that his words targeted a specific person. The courts, on the other hand, accepted that some of the addressees of the remarks were the managers of the Institution, on the grounds that the applicant was a subcontracted worker and the participants in the criminal case were managers at the same Institution as the applicant. It was only possible for the courts of first instance to accept that the applicant’s main purpose was to humiliate the managers of the Institution by attributing meanings to the words used by the applicant beyond the meaning given by the applicant.
Moreover, the applicant claimed that the pressure on subcontracted workers could only be carried out by “people who do not have the qualities of management and humanity”, and he presented his criticisms in an exaggerated manner. In many of its judgements, the Constitutional Court has recognised that freedom of expression should be interpreted broadly to allow a degree of exaggeration and even provocation. Therefore, it cannot be said that there is a situation that requires a departure from the previous assessments of the Constitutional Court in terms of the statements subject to the concrete case.
In the end, the courts of first instance could not objectively and convincingly demonstrate that the statements subject to the concrete case were of such a nature as to require an extremely severe intervention such as termination of the employment contract, which can be considered as a last resort.
For the reasons explained above, the Constitutional Court decided that the freedom of expression was violated.
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